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Abstract
Quantum information is well-known to achieve cryptographic feats that are
unattainable using classical information alone. Here, we add to this repertoire
by introducing a new cryptographic functionality called uncloneable encryp-
tion. This functionality allows the encryption of a classical message such that
two collaborating but isolated adversaries are prevented from simultaneously
recovering the message, even when the encryption key is revealed. Clearly, such
functionality is unattainable using classical information alone.
We formally define uncloneable encryption, and show how to achieve it using
Wiesner’s conjugate coding, combined with a quantum-secure pseudorandom
function (qPRF). Modelling the qPRF as an oracle, we show security by adapt-
ing techniques from the quantum one-way-to-hiding lemma, as well as using
bounds from quantum monogamy-of-entanglement games.
1 Introduction
One of the key distinctions between classical and quantum information is given by
the no-cloning principle: unlike bits, arbitrary qubits cannot be perfectly copied
[Par70, WZ82, Die82]. This principle is the basis of many of the feats of quan-
tum cryptography, including quantum money [Wie83] and quantum key distribution
(QKD) [BB84] (for a survey on quantum cryptography, see [BS16]).
In QKD, two parties establish a shared secret key, using public quantum com-
munication combined with an authentic classical channel. The quantum communi-
cation allows to detect eavesdropping: when the parties detect only a small amount
of eavesdropping, they can produce a shared string that is essentially guaranteed
to be private. Gottesman [Got03] studied quantum tamper-detection in the case of
encryption schemes: in this work, a classical message is encrypted into a quantum
ciphertext such that, at decryption time, the receiver will detect if an adversary
could have information about the plaintext when the key is revealed. We note
that classical information alone cannot produce such encryption schemes, since it is
always possible to perfectly copy ciphertexts.
Notably, Gottesman left open the question of an encryption scheme that would
prevent the splitting of a ciphertext. In other words, would it be possible to encrypt
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a classical message into a quantum ciphertext, such that no attack at the ciphertext
level would be significantly successful in producing two quantum registers, each of
which, when combined with the decryption key, could be used to reconstruct the
plaintext?
In this work, we define, construct and prove security for a scheme that answers
Gottesman’s question in the positive. We call this uncloneable encryption. The
core technical aspects of this work were first presented in one of the author’s M.Sc.
thesis [Lor19].
1.1 Summary of Contributions
We consider encryption schemes that encode classical plaintexts into quantum ci-
phertexts, which we formalize in Definition 4. For simplicity, in this work, we con-
sider only the one-time, symmetric-key case. Next, we define uncloneable encryption
(Definition 8). Informally, this can be thought of as a game, played between the hon-
est sender (Alice) and two malicious recipients (Bob and Charlie). First, Alice picks
a message m ∈ {0, 1}n and a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ) (κ is a polynomial in some security
parameter, λ). She encrypts her message into a quantum ciphertext register R.
Initially, Bob and Charlie are physically together, and they receive R. They apply
a quantum map to produce two registers: Bob keeps register B and Charlie keeps
register C. Bob and Charlie are then isolated. In the next phase, Alice reveals k to
both parties. Using k and their quantum register, Bob and Charlie producemB and
mC respectively. Bob and Charlie win if and only if mB = mC = m. The scheme is
t-uncloneable secure if their winning probability is upper bounded by 2−n+t + η(λ)
for a negligible η.
Assuming that Alice picks her message uniformly at random, our results are
summarized in Fig. 1, where we plot upper bounds for the winning probability of
Bob and Charlie against various types of encodings, according to the length of m.
First of all, if the encoding is classical, then Bob and Charlie can each keep a copy
of the ciphertext. Combined with the key k, each party decrypts to obtain m. This
gives the horizontal line at Pr[Adversaries win] = 1. Next, a lower bound on the
winning probability for any encryption scheme is 12n (corresponding to the parties
coordinating a random guess). This is the ideal curve. Our goal is therefore to
produce an encryption scheme that matches the ideal curve as close as possible.
It may seem that asking that Alice sample her message uniformly at random
would be particularly restrictive, but this is not the case — we show in Theorem 9
that security in the case of uniformly sampled messages implies security in the
case of non-uniformly sampled messages, if the message size does not grow with
the security parameter. Specifically, if Bob and Charlie can win with probability at
most 2−n+t+η(λ) when the message is sampled uniformly at random, for some t and
some negligible function η, then they can win with probability at most 2−h+t+η′(λ)
if the message m is sampled from a distribution with a min-entropy of h where η′ is
a negligible function which is larger than η.
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Figure 1: Upper-bounds on winning probabilities for various types of encodings
(up to negligible functions of λ) for messages sampled uniformly at random.
Our first attempt at realizing uncloneable encryption (Section 4.1) shows that
the well-known Wiesner conjugate coding [Wie83] already achieves a security bound
that is better than any classical scheme. For any strings x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n, define
the Wiesner state
∣∣xθ〉 = Hθ1 |x1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Hθn |xn〉. The encryption uses a ran-
dom key r, θ ∈ {0, 1}n and maps a classical message m into the quantum state
ρ =
∣∣(m⊕ r)θ〉〈(m⊕ r)θ∣∣; given r, θ, decryption consists in measuring in the basis
determined by θ to obtain x and then computing x⊕ r. We sketch a proof that this
satisfies a notion of security for encryption schemes. The question of uncloneability
then boils down to: “How well can an adversary split ρ into two registers, each of
which, combined with (θ, r) can reconstruct m?” This question is answered in prior
work on monogamy-of-entanglement games [TFKW13]: an optimal strategy wins
with probability
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)n
. This is again illustrated in Fig. 1.
In order to improve this bound, we use a quantum-secure pseudorandom function
(qPRF) fλ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}n (see Definition 3). The encryption (see
Section 4.2) consists of a quantum state ρ =
∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣ for random r, θ ∈ {0, 1}λ,
together with a classical string c = m⊕ fλ(s, r) for a random s. The key k consists
in θ and s. Once again, it can be shown that this is an encryption scheme in a
more usual sense and we sketch this argument in Section 4.2. Intuitively, the use
of fλ affords us a gain in uncloneable security, because an adversary who wants
to output m would need to know the pre-image of m under fλ(s, ·). Reaching
a formal proof along these lines, however, is tricky. First, we model the qPRF
using a quantum oracle [BBC+01, BDF+11]; this limits the adversaries’ interaction
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with the qPRF to be black-box quantum queries. Next, the quantum oracle model
is notoriously tricky to use and many of the techniques in the classical literature
are not directly applicable. Fortunately, we can adapt techniques from Unruh’s
quantum one-way-to-hiding lemma [Unr15] to the two-player setting, which enables
us to recover a precise statement along the lines of the intuition above. We thus
complete the proof of our main Theorem 22, obtaining the bound 9 · 12n + negl(λ).
This is the fourth and final curve in Fig. 1.
In addition to the above, we formally define a different type of uncloneable secu-
rity: inspired by more standard security definitions of indistinguishability, we define
uncloneable-indistinguishability (Definition 11). This security definition bounds the
advantage that the adversaries have at simultaneously distinguishing between an
encryption of 0n and an encryption of a plaintext of length n, as prepared by the
adversaries. In a series of results (Theorems 12 and 23 and Corollary 24), we show
that our main protocol achieves this security notion against adversaries that use
unentangled strategies and if the message size does not grow with λ. As discussed
in Section 1.2, there are interesting uses cases where we can assume that the adver-
saries do not share entanglement.
We note that our protocols (both Definition 13 and Definition 16) have the desir-
able property of being prepare-and-measure schemes. This means that the quantum
technology for the honest users is limited to the preparation of single-qubit pure
states, as well as to single-qubit measurements; these quantum technologies are ma-
ture and commercially available. (Note, however, that quantum storage remains a
major challenge at the implementation level).
1.2 Applications
While our focus is on the conceptual contribution of defining and proving a new
primitive, we believe that uncloneable encryption could have many applications.
We give two such examples.
Quantum Money. As it captures the idea of “uncloneable classical information”
in a very generic manner, uncloneable encryption can be used as a tool to build other
primitives which leverage the uncloneability of quantum states. As an example, any
uncloneable secure encryption scheme naturally yields a private-key quantum money
scheme [Wie83, AC12].
To obtain quantum money from an uncloneable encryption scheme, we iden-
tify the notion of “simultaneously passing the bank’s verification” with the notion
of “simultaneously obtaining the correct plaintext”. To generate a banknote, the
bank samples a message m, a key k, a serial number s and produces as output
(s,Enc(k,m)), where Enc(k,m) is the uncloneable encryption of m with the key
k. When the bank is asked to verify a banknote, it verifies the serial number in its
database to retrieve k, decrypts the ciphertext and verifies if the message obtained
is indeed m.
4
The uncloneable security guarantee implies that the probability of a malicious
party producing two banknotes which pass this test is negligible. If this were not
the case, we could use the attack which counterfeits the banknote to essentially copy
the ciphertext in the underlying uncloneable encryption scheme. The adversaries
tasked with obtaining the message once the key is revealed then simply decrypt as
if they were the honest receivers.
Preventing Storage Attacks by Classical Adversaries. Indistinguishable-
uncloneable encryption prevents a single eavesdropping adversary with no quantum
memory from collecting ciphertexts exchanged by two honest parties in the hope of
later learning the key. We sketch an argument for this fact.
Suppose such an adversary obtains a ciphertext encoded with an uncloneable-
indistinguishable encryption scheme. We claim that they cannot correctly determine
if the ciphertext corresponds to the encryption of 0n or of some known message m
with non-negligible advantage, even if the decryption key becomes known after their
measurement of the ciphertext. If such an adversary existed, it could be used to
break the uncloneable-indistinguishable security of the encryption scheme. Indeed,
the almost classical eavesdropper could create two copies of their classical memory
and distribute it to the two adversaries who attempt to obtain the message once the
key is revealed.1
Note that the adversaries in this attack do not share any entanglement and so
we can apply Corollary 24 which states that our encryption scheme is uncloneable-
indistinguishable secure under this condition.
Our work is currently in the private-key setting, but can be extended in a
straightforward way to the public-key setting. In this scenario, we can still guaran-
tee the secrecy of the message even if the eavesdropper is later able to determine the
decryption key from the publicly known encryption key. In other words, an eaves-
dropping adversary with no quantum memory would need to attack the ciphertext
at the moment of transmission. This is known as everlasting security or long-term
security.
1.3 More on Related Work
Starting with the foundational work of Wiesner [Wie83], a rich body of literature
has considered the encoding of classical information into quantum states in order to
take advantage of quantum properties for cryptography.
Quantum Key Recycling. The concept of quantum key recycling is a precursor
to the QKD protocol, developed by Bennett, Brassard, and Breidbart [BBB14] (the
manuscript was prepared in 1982 but only published recently). According to this
protocol, it is possible to encrypt a classical message into a quantum state, such
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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that information-theoretic security is assured, but in addition, a tamper detection
mechanism would allow the one-time pad key to be re-used in the case that no
eavesdropping is detected. Quantum key recycling has been the object of recent
related work [DPS05, FS17].
Tamper-Evident Encryption. We referred above to tamper-detection in the
case of encryption, which we will also call tamper-evident encryption. However, we
emphasize that the author originally called this contribution uncloneable encryption
[Got03]. We justify this choice of re-labelling in quoting the conclusion of the work:
One difficulty with such generalizations is that it is unclear to what
extent the name “uncloneable encryption” is really deserved. I have not
shown that a message protected by uncloneable encryption cannot be
copied — only that Eve cannot copy it without being detected. Is it
possible for Eve to create two states, (...), which can each be used (in
conjunction with the secret key) to extract a good deal of information
about the message? Or can one instead prove bounds, for instance,
on the sum of the information content of the various purported copies?
[Got03]
Since our work addresses this question, we have appropriately re-labeled prior work
according to a seemingly more accurate name.
To the best of our knowledge, the precise relationship between quantum key-
recycling, tamper-evident encryption, and uncloneable encryption is unknown (see
Section 1.4).
Quantum Copy-Protection. Further related work includes the study of quan-
tum copy-protection, as initiated by Aaronson [Aar09]. Informally, this is a means
to encode a function (from a given family of functions) into a quantum program
state, such that an honest party can evaluate the function given the program state,
but it would be impossible to somehow split the quantum program state so as to
enable two parties to simultaneously evaluate the function. Aaronson gave protocols
for quantum copy-protection in an oracle model, but left wide open the question of
quantum copy-protection in the plain model. In a way, uncloneable encryption is a
first step towards quantum copy-protection, since it prevents copying of data, which
can be seen as a unit of information that is even simpler than a function.
1.4 Outlook and Future Work
In this work, we show that, thanks to quantum information, one of the basic tacit
assumptions of encryption, namely that an adversary can copy ciphertexts, is chal-
lenged. We believe that this has the potential to significantly change the landscape
of cryptography, for instance in terms of techniques for key management [Bar16].
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Furthermore, our techniques could become building blocks for a theory of unclone-
able cryptography.
Our work leads to many follow-up questions, broadly classified according to the
following themes:
Improvements. There are many possible improvements to the current work. For
instance: Could our scheme be made resilient to errors? Can we remove the re-
liance on the oracle, and/or on the qPRF? Could an encryption scheme simultane-
ously be uncloneable and provide tamper detection? Would achieving uncloneable-
indistinguishable security be possible, without any restrictions on the adversary’s
strategy?
Links with related work. What are the links, if any, between uncloneable en-
cryption, tamper-evident encryption [Got03], and quantum encryption with key
recycling [BBB14, DPS05, FS17]? We note that both uncloneable encryption and
quantum encryption with key recycling [FS17] make use of theorems developed in
the context of one-sided device-independent QKD [TFKW13]. Can we make more
formal links between these primitives?
More uncloneability. Finally, our work paves the way for the study of more com-
plex unclonable primitives. Could this lead to uncloneable programs [Aar09]? What
about in complexity theory, could we define and realize uncloneable proofs [Aar09]?
1.5 Outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
some basic notation and useful results from the literature. In Section 3, we formally
define uncloneable encryption schemes and their security. Our two protocols are
described and proved secure in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present basic notation, together with techniques from prior work
that are used in the remainder of the paper.
2.1 Notation and Basics of Quantum Information
We denote the set of all functions of the form f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m by Bool(n,m).
We denote the set of strictly positive natural numbers by N+. All Hilbert spaces
are finite dimensional. We overload the expectation symbol E in the following way:
If X is a finite set, X a random variable on X, and f : X → R some function, we
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define
E
x←X
f(x) =
∑
x∈X
Pr [x = X ] f(x). (1)
If we omit the random variable, we assume a uniform distribution. In other words,
Ex f(x) =
1
|X|
∑
x∈X f(x).
A comprehensive introduction to quantum information and quantum computing
may be found in [NC00, Wat18]. We fix some notation in the following paragraphs.
Let Q = C2 be the state space of a single qubit. In particular, Q is a two-
dimensional complex Hilbert space spanned by the orthonormal set {|0〉 , |1〉}. For
any n ∈ N+, we write Q(n) = Q⊗n and note that
{|s〉 = |s1〉 ⊗ |s2〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |sn〉}s∈{0,1}n (2)
forms an orthonormal basis of Q(n).
Let H be a Hilbert space. The set of all unitary and density operators on H are
denoted by U(H) and D(H), respectively. We recall that the operator norm of any
linear operator A : H → H′ between finite dimensional Hilbert spaces is given by
‖A‖ = max
v∈H
‖v‖=1
‖Av‖ (3)
and satisfies the property that ‖Av‖ ≤ ‖A‖ · ‖v‖. If A is either a projector or a
unitary operator, then ‖A‖ = 1.
We use the term “quantum state” to refer to both unit vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H and to
density operators ρ ∈ D(H) on some Hilbert space.
If H ∈ U(Q) is the Hadamard operator defined by
|0〉 7→ |0〉+ |1〉√
2
and |1〉 7→ |0〉 − |1〉√
2
(4)
then, for any strings x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n, we define∣∣∣xθ〉 = Hθ1 |x1〉 ⊗Hθ2 |x2〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗Hθn |xn〉 (5)
and note that
{∣∣sθ〉}
s∈{0,1}n forms an orthonormal basis of Q(n). Following their
prominent use in [Wie83], we call states of the form
∣∣xθ〉 Wiesner states and, for
any fixed θ ∈ {0, 1}n, we call {∣∣sθ〉}
s∈{0,1}n a Wiesner basis.
For any n ∈ N+, we define the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen [EPR35] (EPR) state by
|EPRn〉 = 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 |x〉 (6)
and note that it is an element of Q(2n).
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A positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) on a Hilbert space H is a
finite collection of positive semidefinite operators {Ei}i∈I on H which sum to the
identity. A projective measurement is a POVM composed of projectors.
We also recall that physically permissible transformation of a quantum system
precisely coincide with the set of completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) maps.
In particular, CPTP map will map density operators to density operators.
A polynomial-time uniform family of circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N+ is a collection of
quantum circuits indexed by N+ such that there exists a polynomial-time deter-
ministic Turing machine T which, on input 1λ, produces a description of Cλ. We
refer to such families as efficient circuits. Each circuit Cλ defines and implements a
certain CPTP map Cλ : D(HIn,λ)→ D(HOut,λ), where the Hilbert spaces HIn,λ and
HOut,λ are implicitly defined by the circuit. Note that we consider general, which
is to say possibly non-unitary, circuits. These were introduced in [AKN98]. It is
worth noting that a universal gate set for general quantum circuits exists which is
composed of only unitary gates, implementing maps of the form ρ 7→ UρU † for some
unitary operator U , and two non-unitary maps which are
• the single qubit partial trace map Tr : D(Q)→ D(C) and
• the state preparation map Aux : D(C)→ D(Q) defined by 1 7→ |0〉〈0|.
Further information on this circuit model can be found in [Wat09].
2.2 Monogamy of Entanglement Games
Monogamy-of-entanglement games were introduced and studied in [TFKW13]. In
short, a monogamy-of-entanglement game is played by Alice against cooperating Bob
and Charlie. Alice describes to Bob and Charlie a collection of different POVMs
which she could use to measure a quantum state on a Hilbert space HA. These
POVMs are indexed by a finite set Θ and each reports a measurement result taken
from a finite set X. Bob and Charlie then produce a tripartite quantum state
ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC), giving the A register to Alice, the B register to Bob and
the C register to Charlie. Alice then picks a θ ∈ Θ, measures her subsystem with
the corresponding POVM and obtains some result x ∈ X. She then announces θ to
Bob and Charlie who are now isolated. Bob and Charlie win if and only if they can
both simultaneously guess the result x.
Upper bounds on the winning probability of Bob and Charlie in such games was
the primary subject of study in [TFKW13]. One of their main results, corresponding
to a game where Alice measures in a random Wiesner basis, is as follows.
Theorem 1.
Let λ ∈ N+. For any Hilbert spaces HB and HC , any collections of POVMs{{
Bθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}n
and
{{
Cθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}n
(7)
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on these Hilbert spaces, and any state ρ ∈ D(Q(λ)⊗HB ⊗HC), we have that
E
θ
∑
x∈{0,1}λ
Tr
[(∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣⊗Bθx ⊗ Cθx) ρ] ≤
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)λ
. (8)
Using standard techniques, we can recast this theorem in a context where Alice
sends to Bob and Charlie a random Wiesner state and Bob and Charlie split this
state among themselves via some CPTP map Φ.
Corollary 2.
Let λ ∈ N+. For any Hilbert spaces HB and HC , any collections of POVMs{{
Bθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
and
{{
Cθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
(9)
on these Hilbert spaces, and any CPTP map Φ : D(Q(λ))→ D(HB ⊗HC), we have
that
E
θ
E
x
Tr
[(
Bθx ⊗ Cθx
)
Φ
(∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣)] ≤ (1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)λ
. (10)
The proof is relegated to Appendix A, but conceptually follows from a two-step
argument. First, we only consider states of the form (1⊗ Φ) |EPRλ〉〈EPRλ| for
some CPTP map Φ and where Alice keeps the intact subsytems from the EPR
pairs. Then, we apply the correspondence between Alice measuring her half of an
EPR pair in a random Wiesner basis and her sending a random Wiesner state. This
correspondence is similar to the one used in the Shor-Preskill proof of security for
the BB84 QKD protocol [SP00].
Corollary 2 can be seen as the source of “uncloneability” for our upcoming pro-
tocols. When Alice sends a state
∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣, picked uniformly at random, to Bob and
Charlie, she has a guarantee that it is unlikely for both of them to learn x even if
she later divulges θ.
It is worth noting that Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 have no computational or
hardness assumptions. This makes them an ideal tool with which to build unclone-
able encryption schemes.
2.3 Oracles and Quantum-Secure Pseudorandom Functions
A quantum-secure pseudorandom function is a keyed function which appears random
to an efficient quantum adversary who only sees its input/output behaviour and is
ignorant of the particular key being used. We formally define this notion with the
help of oracles. Quantum accessible oracles have been previously studied in the
literature, for example in [BBC+01, BDF+11, Unr15].
Given a function H ∈ Bool(n,m), a quantum circuit C is said to have oracle
access to H, denoted CH , if we add to its gate set a gate implementing the unitary
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operator OH ∈ U(Q(n)Q ⊗Q(m)R) defined on computational basis states by
|x〉Q ⊗ |y〉R 7→ |x〉Q ⊗ |y ⊕H(x)〉R . (11)
Colloquially, we are giving C a “black box” which computes the function H. Note
that if H,H ′ ∈ Bool(n,m) are two functions, we can obtain the circuit CH′ from
CH by replacing every instance of the OH gate by the OH
′
gate.
We can now give a definition, inspired by the one in [Zha12], of a quantum-secure
pseudorandom function.
Definition 3 (Quantum-Secure Pseudorandom Function).
A quantum-secure pseudorandom function F is a collection of functions
F =
{
fλ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}ℓIn(λ) → {0, 1}ℓOut(λ)
}
λ∈N+
(12)
where ℓIn, ℓOut : N
+ → N+ and such that:
1. There is an efficient quantum circuit F = {Fλ}λ∈N+ such that Fλ implements
the CPTP map Fλ(ρ) = UλρU
†
λ where Uλ ∈ U(Q(λ + ℓIn(λ) + ℓOut(λ))) is
defined by
Uλ
( |k〉 |a〉 |b〉 ) = |k〉 |a〉 |b⊕ fλ(k, a)〉 . (13)
2. For all efficient quantum circuits D = {DHλ }λ∈N+ having oracle access to a
function of the form H ∈ Bool(ℓIn(λ), ℓOut(λ)), each implementing a CPTP
map of the form DHλ : D(C) → D(Q), there is a negligible function η such
that: ∣∣∣∣Ek Tr [ |0〉〈0|Dfλ(k,·)λ (1)]− EH Tr [ |0〉〈0|DHλ (1)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η(λ) . (14)
We should think of D as a circuit which attempts to distinguish two different
cases: is it given oracle access to an instance of the pseudorandom function, which
is to say f(k, ·) : {0, 1}ℓIn(λ) → {0, 1}ℓOut(λ) for a randomly sampled k ∈ {0, 1}λ? Or
to a function that was sampled truly at random, H ∈ Bool(ℓIn(λ), ℓOut(λ))?
The circuit takes no input and produces a single bit of output, via measuring a
single qubit in the computational basis. The bound given in the definition ensures
that the probability distribution of the output does not change by much in both
scenarios.
In his work on quantum-secure pseudorandom functions [Zha12], Zhandry showed
that certain pseudorandom functions that are secure against classical adversaries are
insecure against quantum adversaries. Fortunately, Zhandry also showed that some
common constructions of pseudorandom functions remain secure against quantum
adversaries.
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3 Uncloneable Encryption
The encryption of classical plaintexts into classical ciphertexts has been extensively
studied. The study of encrypting quantum plaintexts into quantum ciphertexts has
also received some attention, for example in [ABF+16]. Uncloneable encryption
is a security notion for classical plaintexts which is impossible to achieve in any
meaningful way with classical ciphertexts. Thus, we need to formally define a notion
of quantum encryptions for classical messages.
3.1 Quantum Encryptions of Classical Messages
A quantum encryption of classical messages scheme is a procedure which takes as
input a plaintext and a key, in the form of classical bit strings, and produces a
ciphertext in the form of a quantum state. We model these schemes as efficient
quantum circuits and CPTP maps where classical bit strings are identified with
computational basis states: s↔ |s〉〈s|. Our schemes are parametrized by a security
parameter λ. In general, the message size n = n(λ), the key size κ = κ(λ), and the
size of the ciphertext ℓ = ℓ(λ) may depend on λ. This is formalized in Definition 4.
Definition 4 (Quantum Encryption of Classical Messages).
A quantum encryption of classical messages (QECM) scheme is a triplet of efficient
quantum circuits S = (Key, Enc, Dec) implementing CPTP maps of the form
• Keyλ : D(C)→ D(HK,λ),
• Encλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HM,λ)→ D(HT,λ), and
• Decλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(HM,λ)
where HM,λ = Q(n(λ)) is the plaintext space, HT,λ = Q(ℓ(λ)) is the ciphertext
space, and HK,λ = Q(κ(λ)) is the key space for functions n, ℓ, κ : N+ → N+.
For all λ ∈ N+, k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ), and m ∈ {0, 1}n(λ), the maps must satisfy
Tr[|k〉〈k|Key(1)] > 0 =⇒ Tr[|m〉〈m|Deck ◦ Enck |m〉〈m|] = 1 (15)
where λ is implicit, Enck is the CPTP map defined by ρ 7→ Enc(|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ), and we
define Deck analogously.
A short discussion on the key generation circuit, Key, is in order. First, note that
Key takes no input. Indeed, the domain of Keyλ is D(C) and C is the state space of
zero qubits. In particular, there is a single valid quantum state on C: D(C) = {1}.
To generate a classical key to be used by the encryption and decryption circuits Encλ
and Decλ, a party runs the circuit Keyλ and obtains the quantum state Keyλ(1).
This quantum state is then measured in the computational basis and the result of
this measurement is used as the key. We then see that Eq. (15) is a correctness
condition which imposes that, for all keys that may be generated, a valid ciphertext
is always correctly decrypted.
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3.2 Security Notions
Now that we have formal definition for QECM schemes, we can define security
notions for these schemes. We define three such notions:
1. Indistinguishable security. Conceptually inspired by the original security no-
tion of indistinguishable encryptions [GM84], which considers classical plain-
texts and classical ciphertexts, and similar in details to an analogue definition
in [ABF+16] which considers quantum plaintexts and quantum ciphertexts,
this security notion considers classical plaintexts and quantum ciphertexts. It
is formally stated in Definition 6.
2. Uncloneable security. This security notion is novel to this work and captures,
in the broadest sense, what we mean by an “uncloneable encryption scheme”.
This security notion is defined in Definition 8 and is paramatrized by a real
value 0 ≤ t ≤ n, where n is the message size. The case where t = 0 is ideal and
t = n is trivial. In particular, no encryption scheme with classical ciphertexts
may achieve t-uncloneable security for t < n.
3. Uncloneable-indistinguishable security. This security notion is also novel to
this work. It can be seen as a combination of indistinguishable and uncloneable
security. It is formally defined in Definition 11.
Each of these security notions is defined in two steps. First, we define a type
of attack (Definitions 5, 7 and 10). Then, we say that the QECM scheme achieves
the given security notion if all admissible attacks have their winning probability
appropriately bounded (Definitions 6, 8 and 11). The definitions for uncloneable
security and uncloneable-indistinguishable security will formalize the games which
we described in Section 1.1.
Note that many classical encryption schemes which are secure against quantum
adversaries, such as the one-time pad, are indistinguishable secure but satisfy neither
uncloneable security notions as their ciphertexts can alway be perfectly copied. We
also discuss in Section 4.1 a scheme which offers non-trivial uncloneable security but
is not in any way uncloneable-indistinguishable secure.
We first define our notion of indistinguishable security.
Definition 5 (Distinguishing Attack).
Let S be a QECM scheme. A distinguishing attack against S is a pair of efficient
quantum circuits A = (G, A) implementing CPTP maps of the form
• Gλ : D(C)→ D(HS,λ ⊗HM,λ) and
• Aλ : D(HS,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(Q)
whereHS,λ = Q(s(λ)) for a function s : N+ → N+ and HM,λ and HT,λ are as defined
in S.
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Definition 6 (Indistinguishable Security).
Let S be an QECM scheme. For a fixed and implicit λ, we define the CPTP map
Enc1k : D(HM,λ)→ D(HT,λ) by
ρ 7→
∑
m∈{0,1}n
Tr [|m〉〈m| ρ] · Enck(|m〉〈m|) (16)
and the CPTP map Enc0k : D(HM,λ)→ D(HT,λ) by
ρ 7→ Enck(|0n〉〈0n|) (17)
where 0n ∈ {0, 1}n is the all zero bit string.
Then, we say that S is indistinguishable secure if for all distinguishing attacks
A against S there exists a negligible function η such that
E
b
E
k←K
Tr
[
|b〉〈b|Aλ ◦
(
1S ⊗ Encbk
)
◦G(1)
]
≤ 1
2
+ η(λ) (18)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, b ∈ {0, 1}, and Kλ is the random variable
distributed on {0, 1}κ(λ) such that Pr [Kλ = k] = Tr [|k〉〈k|Keyλ(1)].
In Definition 6, the map Enc0k should be seen as discarding whatever plaintext
was given and producing the encryption of the all zero bit string. On the other
hand, Enc1k is the map which first measures the state given in the computational
basis, to ensure that the plaintext is indeed a classical message, and then encrypts
this message. We say that a QECM scheme has indistinguishable security if no
efficient adversary can distinguish between both of these scenarios with more then
a negligible advantage. This security notion allows us to show that the schemes we
define do offer a level of security as encryption schemes.
Next, we formalize the intuitive definition for uncloneable security as given by
the game described in Section 1.1. In Fig. 2, we sketch out the relation between the
various CPTP maps and the underlying Hilber spaces considered in this definition.
Definition 7 (Cloning Attack).
Let S be a QECM scheme. A cloning attack against S is a triplet of efficient
quantum circuits A = (A, B, C) implementing CPTP maps of the form
• Aλ : D(HT,λ)→ D(HB,λ ⊗HC,λ),
• Bλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HB,λ)→ D(HM,λ), and
• Cλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HC,λ)→ D(HM,λ)
where HB,λ = Q(β(λ)) and HC,λ = Q(γ(λ)) for some functions β, γ : N+ → N+ and
HK,λ, HM,λ, and HT,λ are as defined by S.
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HC
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Ck
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the maps considered in a cloning attack as
given in Definition 7.
Definition 8 (Uncloneable Security).
A QECM scheme S is t(λ)-uncloneable secure if for all cloning attacks A against S
there exists a negligible function η such that
E
m
E
k←K
Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦Enck (|m〉〈m|)] ≤ 2−n+t(λ) + η(λ)
(19)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, Kλ is a random variable distributed on
{0, 1}κ(λ) such that Pr [Kλ = k] = Tr [|k〉〈k|Keyλ(1)] and Bk is the CPTP map
defined by ρ 7→ B(|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ) and similarly for Ck.
If S is 0-uncloneable secure, we say that it is simply uncloneable secure.
We note that any encryption which produces classical ciphertexts cannot be t-
uncloneable secure for any t < n. Indeed, an attack A where A copies the classical
ciphertext and where B = C = Dec succeeds with probability 1.
Our definition of uncloneable security is with respect to messages sampled uni-
formly at random. However, if the length of the message is fixed, t-uncloneable
security implies a similar security notion for messages sampled according to other
distributions. We formalize this in the next theorem.
Theorem 9.
Let S be a QECM scheme which is t-uncloneable secure and whose message size is
constant, i.e.: n(λ) = n. Let M be a random variable distributed over {0, 1}n with
min-entropy h. Then, for any cloning attack A on S there is a negligible function η
such that
E
m←M
E
k←K
Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦ A ◦ Enck |m〉〈m|] ≤ 2−h+t(λ) + η(λ)
(20)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side.
Proof. For all k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ) and m ∈ {0, 1}n, define
p(k,m) = Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦ A ◦ Enck (|m〉〈m|)] . (21)
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Recalling the min-entropy of M and that S is t-uncloneable, we may write
E
m←M
E
k←K
Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦Enck (|m〉〈m|)] (22)
=
∑
m∈{0,1}n
Pr [M = m] E
k←K
p(k,m) ≤ 2−h · 2n E
m
E
k←K
p(k,m) ≤ 2−h (2t + 2nη(λ)) .
Noting that λ 7→ 2−h+nη(λ) is a negligible function concludes the proof.
Finally, we formalize the notion of uncloneable-indistinguishable security (see
Section 1.1 for a description in terms of a game, and Fig. 3 for the relation between
the various CPTP maps and the underlying Hilbert spaces).
Definition 10 (Cloning-Distinguishing Attack).
Let S be a QECM scheme. A cloning-distinguishing attack against S is a tuple
A = (G, A, B, C) of efficient quantum circuits implementing CPTP maps of the form
• Gλ : D(C)→ D(HS,λ ⊗HM,λ),
• Aλ : D(HS,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(HB,λ ⊗HC,λ),
• Bλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HB,λ)→ D(Q), and
• Cλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HC,λ)→ D(Q)
where HS,λ = Q(s(λ)), HB,λ = Q(β(λ)), and HC,λ = Q(α(λ)) for some functions
s, α, β : N+ → N+ and all other Hilbert spaces are as defined by S.
Definition 11 (Uncloneable-Indistinguishable Security).
Let S be a QECM scheme and define Enc0k and Enc1k as in Definition 6.
We say that S is uncloneable-indistinguishable secure if for all cloning-distinguishing
attacks A there exists a negligible function η such that
E
b
E
k←K
Tr
[
(|b〉〈b| ⊗ |b〉〈b|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦
(
1S ⊗ Encbk
)
◦G(1)
]
≤ 1
2
+ η(λ) (23)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, Kλ is distributed on {0, 1}κ(λ) such that
Pr[K = k] = Tr[|k〉〈k|K(1)], Bk is the CPTP map defined by ρ 7→ B(|k〉〈k|⊗ρ), and
similarly for Ck.
C
HM HT
HS HB
HC
Q
Q
G
Encbk
A
Bk
Ck
Figure 3: Relation between the CPTP maps and Hilbert spaces considered in a
cloning-distinguishing attack as described in Definition 10.
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It is trivial to see, but worth noting, that uncloneable-indistinguishable security
implies indistinguishable security. We now briefly sketch the proof.
Let S be an QECM and A = (G, A) be a distinguishing attack which shows that
S is not indistinguishable secure. Then, we can construct a cloning-distinguishing
attack A′ = (G′, A′, B′, C′) which implies that S is not uncloneable-indistinguishable
secure. Set G′ = G and B and C be the circuits which do nothing on a single qubit
input. Then, we define A′ to first run A and measure the output in the compu-
tational basis state. The result is a single classical bit which may then be copied
and given to both B and C. We then observe that the winning probability of A in
the indistinguishable scenario is the same as the winning probability of A′ in the
uncloneable-indistinguishable scenario.
Finally, it can also be shown that any 0-uncloneable secure QECM S is uncloneable-
indistinguishable secure. The proof of Theorem 12 can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 12.
Let S be an QECM. If S is 0-uncloneable secure and has constant message size, i.e.:
n(λ) = n, then it is also uncloneable-indistinguishable secure.
4 Two Protocols
In this section, we first present a protocol for the encryption of classical messages
into quantum ciphertexts based on Wiesner’s conjugate encoding (Section 4.1). This
will also include a simple proof of its uncloneable security. Then, in Section 4.2, we
present a refinement of this first protocol which uses quantum secure pseudorandom
functions. The proof of the uncloneable security of this protocol is more involved
and so we present some technical lemmas in Section 4.3 before we give our final
main results in Section 4.4.
4.1 Conjugate Encryption
Our first QECM scheme is a one-time pad encoded into Wiesner states. We em-
phasize that this scheme will not offer much in terms of uncloneable security but it
remains an instructive example.
Definition 13 (Conjugate Encryption).
We define the conjugate encryption QECM scheme by the following circuits, each
implicitly parametrized by λ. Note that the message size is n(λ) = λ, the key size
is κ(λ) = 2λ and the ciphertext size is ℓ(λ) = λ.
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Circuit 1: The key generation circuit Key.
Input : None.
Output: A state ρ ∈ D(Q(κ)).
1 Sample r ← {0, 1}n uniformly at random.
2 Sample θ ← {0, 1}n uniformly at random.
3 Output ρ = |r〉〈r| ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|.
Circuit 2: The encryption circuit Enc.
Input : A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n and a key (r, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output: A ciphertext ρ ∈ D(Q(n)).
1 Output ρ =
∣∣(m⊕ r)θ〉〈(m⊕ r)θ∣∣.
Circuit 3: The decryption circuit Dec.
Input : A ciphertext ρ ∈ D(Q(n)) and a key (r, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output: A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n.
1 Compute ρ′ = HθρHθ.
2 Measure ρ′ in the computational basis. Call the result c. Output c⊕ r.
The correctness of this scheme is trivial to verify and it is indistinguishable
secure. The latter follows from the fact that if Enc0r,θ and Enc
1
r,θ are as defined in
Definition 6, then for any ρ ∈ D(HS ⊗Q(n)) we have that
E
r
E
θ
(
1S ⊗ Enc1(r,θ)
)
(ρ) = E
r
E
θ
(
1S ⊗ Enc0(r,θ)
)
(ρ). (24)
We will need one small technical lemma before proceeding to the proof of un-
cloneable security for this scheme. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 14.
Let n ∈ N+, f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → R be a function and s ∈ {0, 1}n be a string.
Then,
E
x
f(x, x⊕ s) = E
x
f(x⊕ s, x). (25)
Theorem 15.
The scheme in Definition 13 is λ log2
(
1 + 1√
2
)
-uncloneable secure.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any cloning attack A the quantity
E
m
E
r
E
θ
Tr
[
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (B(r,θ) ⊗ C(r,θ)) ◦ A(∣∣∣(m⊕ r)θ〉〈(m⊕ r)θ∣∣∣)] (26)
is upper bounded by
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
. By applying Lemma 14 with respect to the ex-
pectation over m, this quantity is the same as
E
m
E
r
E
θ
Tr
[
(|m⊕ r〉〈m⊕ r| ⊗ |m⊕ r〉〈m⊕ r|) (B(r,θ) ⊗ C(r,θ)) ◦A(∣∣∣mθ〉〈mθ∣∣∣)] .
(27)
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We then see that for any fixed r, we can apply Corollary 2 to bound the expectation
of the trace over m and θ by
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
. Setting this quantity to be equal to 2−n+t,
recalling that n = λ, and solving for t completes the proof.
Finally, note that this scheme cannot be uncloneable-indistinguishable secure if
n ≥ 2. Indeed, the adversaries could submit the all 1 plaintext to be encrypted and
split the ciphertext such that each adversary gets half of the qubits. Once the key is
revealed, the adversaries can then each obtain half of the message with probability
1. This is sufficient to distinguish between the two possible messages.
4.2 Our Protocol
As discussed in Section 1.1, the motivation for our second QECM scheme is to use
quantum-secure pseudorandom functions to attempt to “distill” the uncloneability
found in the Wiesner state.
Definition 16 (F-Conjugate Encryption).
For a function n : N+ → N+, let
F =
{
fλ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}n(λ)
}
λ∈N+
(28)
be a quantum-secure pseudorandom function. We define the F-conjugate encryption
QECM scheme by the following circuits which are implicitly parametrized by λ. Note
that the message size is the output size of the qPRF, n(λ), the key size is κ(λ) = 2λ,
and the ciphertext size is ℓ(λ) = λ+ n(λ).
Circuit 4: The key generation circuit Key.
Input : None.
Output: A state ρ ∈ D(Q(κ(λ))).
1 Sample s← {0, 1}λ uniformly at random.
2 Sample θ ← {0, 1}λ uniformly at random.
3 Output ρ = |s〉〈s| ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|.
Circuit 5: The encryption circuit Enc.
Input : A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n and a key (s, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output: A ciphertext ρ ∈ D(Q(ℓ(λ))).
1 Sample x← {0, 1}λ uniformly at random.
2 Compute c = m⊕ fλ(s, x).
3 Output ρ = |c〉〈c| ⊗
∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣.
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Circuit 6: The decryption circuit Dec.
Input : A ciphertext |c〉〈c| ⊗ ρ ∈ D(Q(ℓ)) and a key (s, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output: A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n.
1 Compute ρ′ = HθρHθ.
2 Measure ρ′ in the computational basis. Call the result r.
3 Output m = c⊕ fλ(s, r).
It is trivial to see that this scheme is correct and we can also show that it is
indistinguishable secure. The latter follows from the fact that if we use a truly
random function instead of the qPRF then, for any state ρ we have
E
r
E
H∈Bool(λ,n)
(
1S ⊗ Enc0(r,H)
)
(ρ) = E
r
E
H∈Bool(λ,n)
(
1S ⊗ Enc1(r,H)
)
(ρ) (29)
where Enc0(r,H) and Enc
1
(r,H) are as given in Definition 6 except that they use a truly
random function H instead of a keyed qPRF. Thus, any adversary has no advantage
in distinguishing the cases. When the truly random functions are replaced by a
qPRF, the adversary may have at most a negligible advantage in distinguishing
these two cases.
4.3 Technical Lemmas
We first present a few technical lemmas which will be used in our proof of security.
The proof of Lemmas 17 and 18 appear in Appendix A.
Lemma 17.
Let R be a ring with a, b ∈ R and c = a+ b. Then, for all n ∈ N+, we have that
cn = an +
n−1∑
k=0
an−k−1bck. (30)
Lemma 18.
Let H be a Hilbert space, n ∈ N+, and {v0, v1, . . . , vn} be n + 1 vectors in H such
that ‖vi‖ ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ‖
∑n
i=0 vi‖ ≤ 1. Then,∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=0
vi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖v0‖2 + (3n + 2)
n∑
i=1
‖vi‖. (31)
The following implicitly appears in [Unr15].
Lemma 19.
Let f : Bool(n,m) → R be a function and x ∈ {0, 1}n be a string. For any
H ∈ Bool(n,m) and y ∈ {0, 1}m, define Hx,y ∈ Bool(n,m) by
s 7→
{
H(s) if s 6= x,
y if s = x.
(32)
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Then,
E
H
f(H) = E
H
E
y
f(Hx,y). (33)
The following two lemmas form the core of the upcoming proofs of uncloneable
security and they may be interpreted as follows. We consider two adversaries who
have oracle access to a functionH ∈ Bool(λ, n) which is chosen uniformly at random.
Their goal is to simultaneously guess the value H(x) for some value of x. The
adversaries share some quantum state which we interpret as representing all the
information they may initially have on x. The lemmas relate the probability of
both parties simultaneously guessing H(x) to their probability of being able to both
simultaneously guess x.
The first of these lemmas, Lemma 20, considers this problem in a setting where
the adversaries do not share any entanglement. The second, Lemma 21 imposes no
such restriction.
We show that the probability that both adversaries correctly guess H(x) is upper
bounded by
1
2n
+Q ·G or 9 · 1
2n
+Q′ ·G′ (34)
where Q and Q′ are polynomial functions of the number of queries the adversaries
make to the oracle and G and G′ quantify their probability of guessing x with a
particular strategy. The factor of 9 is present only if we allow the adversaries to
share entanglement.
We can interpret G and G′ in a manner very similar to its analogous quantity in
Unruh’s one-way-to-hiding lemma [Unr15]. The adversaries, instead of continuing
until the end of their computation, will stop immediately before a certain (randomly
chosen) query to the oracle and measure their query register in the computational
basis. Then, G is related to the probability that this procedure succeeds at letting
both adversaries simultaneously obtain x, averaged over the possible stopping points
and possible functions implemented by the oracle.
The key idea in the proof of these lemmas is that we can decompose the unitary
operator representing each of the adversaries’ computations into two “parts”. Ex-
plicitly, this decomposition appears in Eqs. (40) and (47). One of these “parts” will
never query the oracle on x and the other could query the oracle on x. We note that
this idea was present in the proof of Unruh’s one-way-to-hiding lemma [Unr15].
Recall from Section 2.3 that we model queries to an oracle implementing a func-
tion H as a unitary operator OH acting on a query and a response register with
Hilbert spaces HQ and HR respectively. This unitary is defined on the computa-
tional basis states by |x〉Q ⊗ |y〉R 7→ |x〉Q ⊗ |y ⊕H(x)〉R. A party having access to
an oracle may also have some other register with Hilbert space HS with which they
perform other computations. In general, their computation can then be modeled by
an operator of the form
(
UOH
)q
where U is a unitary operator on HQ ⊗HR ⊗HS
and q is the number of queries made to the oracle [BBC+01, BDF+11, Unr15].
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Lemma 20.
Let λ, n ∈ N+. For L ∈ {B,C}, we let
• sL, qL ∈ N+,
• HLQ = Q(λ), HLR = Q(n), and HLS = Q(sL),
• UL ∈ U(HLQ ⊗HLR ⊗HLS ), and
• {πyL}y∈{0,1}n be a projective measurement on HLQ ⊗HLR ⊗HLS .
Finally, let |ψ〉 = |ψB〉 ⊗ |ψC〉 be a separable unit vector with |ψL〉 ∈ Q(n+ λ+ sL)
for L ∈ {B,C} and x ∈ {0, 1}λ. Then, we have
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 12n + (3q + 2)q 4√M (35)
where ΠH(x) = π
H(x)
B ⊗ πH(x)C , q = qB + qC and
M = E
k
E
ℓ
E
H
E
H′
∥∥∥∥(|x〉〈x|BQ ⊗ |x〉〈x|CQ)
((
UBO
H
B
)k ⊗ (UCOH′C )ℓ
)
|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥2 (36)
with k ∈ {0, . . . , qB − 1}, ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , qC − 1}, and H ∈ Bool(λ, n).
Proof. Note that since |ψ〉 is separable, we have that
M =
(
E
H
E
k
∥∥∥|x〉〈x|BQ OUB ,H,k |ψB〉∥∥∥2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=MB
·
(
E
H′
E
ℓ
∥∥∥|x〉〈x|CQ OUC ,H′,ℓ |ψC〉∥∥∥2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=MC
. (37)
For the remainder of the proof, we fix L ∈ {B,C} such that ML = min{MB ,MC}.
Note that
√
ML ≤ 4
√
M . Once again using the fact that |ψ〉 is separable, we have
that
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ E
H
∥∥∥πH(x)L (UBOHB )qL |ψL〉∥∥∥2. (38)
With all this, it suffices to show that
E
H
∥∥∥πH(x)L (UBOHB )qL |ψL〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 12n + (3qL + 2)qL√ML (39)
to obtain our result.
Let PL = |x〉〈x|LQ . Using the fact that ULOHL = ULOHL PL+ULOHL (1−PL) and
Lemma 17, we have that
(
ULO
H
L
)qL =
=V HL︷ ︸︸ ︷(
ULO
H
L (1− PL)
)qL +
qL−1∑
k=0
(
ULO
H
L (1− PL)
)qL−k−1
ULO
H
L PL
(
ULO
H
L
)k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=WH,k
L
(40)
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and we define WHL =
∑qL−1
k=0 W
H,k
L so that
(
ULO
H
L
)qL = V HL +WHL .
Using Lemma 18, the definition of the various W operators, and properties of
the operator norm on projectors and unitary operators, we have that∥∥∥πH(x)L (V HL +WHL ) |ψL〉∥∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥∥πH(x)L VL |ψL〉∥∥∥2 + (3qL + 2)qL E
k
∥∥∥PL (ULOHL )k |ψL〉∥∥∥.
(41)
Using Jensen’s inequality, the above inequality, and the definition of ML, we have
that
E
H
∥∥∥πH(x)L ((ULOHL )qL) |ψL〉∥∥∥2 ≤ E
H
∥∥∥πH(x)L VL |ψL〉∥∥∥2 + (3qL + 2)qL√ML (42)
and so it suffices to show that EH
∥∥∥πH(x)L V HL |ψL〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 2−n. By Lemma 19, it is then
sufficient to show that
E
H
E
y
∥∥∥πyLV Hx,yL |ψL〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 2−n (43)
where Hx,y ∈ Bool(λ, n) is defined by Hx,y(x) = y and Hx,y(s) = H(s) for all s 6= x.
Recall that V HL is independent of the value of H(x), in the sense that V
Hx,y
L = V
H
L
for all y ∈ {0, 1}n. Indeed, prior to every query to H in V HL , we project the state on
a subspace which does not query H on x. So, using the fact that each πyL projects
on mutually orthogonal subspaces and that
∥∥V HL ∥∥ ≤ 1, we have that
E
y
∥∥∥πyLV Hx,yL |ψL〉∥∥∥2 = 12n∥∥V HL |ψL〉∥∥2 ≤ 12n (44)
which completes the proof.
Lemma 21.
Let λ, n ∈ N+. For L ∈ {B,C}, we let
• sL, qL ∈ N+,
• HLQ = Q(λ), HLR = Q(n), and HLS = Q(sL),
• UL ∈ U(HLQ ⊗HLR ⊗HLS ), and
• {πyL}y∈{0,1}n be a projective measurement on HLQ ⊗HLR ⊗HLS .
Finally, let |ψ〉 ∈ Q(2(λ+ n) + sB + sC) be a unit vector and x ∈ {0, 1}λ. Then, we
have
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 92n + (3qBqC + 2)qBqC√M (45)
where ΠH(x) = π
H(x)
B ⊗ πH(x)C and
M = E
k
E
ℓ
E
H
∥∥∥(|x〉〈x|BQ ⊗ |x〉〈x|CQ)((UBOHB )k ⊗ (UCOHC )ℓ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 (46)
with k ∈ {0, . . . , qB − 1}, ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , qC − 1}, and H ∈ Bool(λ, n).
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Proof. For L ∈ {B,C}, we define PL = |x〉〈x|LQ . Using Lemma 17 and the fact that
ULO
H
L = ULO
H
L PL + ULO
H
L (1− PL), we have that
(
ULO
H
L
)qL =
=V HL︷ ︸︸ ︷(
ULO
H
L (1− PL)
)qL +
qL−1∑
k=0
(
ULO
H (1− PL)
)qL−k−1
ULO
H
L PL
(
ULO
H
L
)k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=WH,k
L
(47)
and we define WHL =
∑qL−1
k=0 W
H,k
L . This implies that∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC +WHB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2. (48)
We now claim that contribution from theWHB ⊗WHC operator corresponds to theM
in the upper bound provided in the statement. Indeed, using Lemma 18, the defini-
tion of the various W operators, and properties of the operator norm on projectors
and unitary operators, we have that∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC +WHB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
≤
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
+ (3qBqC + 2)qBqC E
k
E
ℓ
∥∥∥(PB ⊗ PC)((UBOHB )k ⊗ (UCOHC )ℓ) |ψ〉∥∥∥.
(49)
Using Jensen’s inequality, the above inequality and the definition of M , we have
that
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC +WHB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
≤ E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 + (3qBqC + 2)qBqC√M.
(50)
It now suffices to show that
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 92n . (51)
By Lemma 19, this is equivalent to showing that
E
H
E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((UBOHx,yB )qB ⊗ V Hx,yC + V Hx,yB ⊗WHx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 92n (52)
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In fact, it will be sufficient to show that for any particular H, the expectation over
y is bounded by 9 · 2−n. If, for any H, we define
α = E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((UBOHx,yB )⊗ V Hx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 (53)
and
β = E
y
∥∥∥Πy (V Hx,yB ⊗WHx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 (54)
then, using the triangle inequality and the fact that the operators in {Πy}y∈{0,1}n
project on mutually orthogonal subspaces, we have that
E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((OBOHx,yB )qB ⊗ V Hx,yC + V Hx,yB ⊗WHx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ α+ β + 2√αβ. (55)
Now, noting that V
Hx,y
B and V
Hx,y
C do not depend on the value of y, as they always
project on a subspace which does not query the oracle H on x, and using properties
of the operator norm, we have that
α = E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((UBOHx,yB )⊗ V Hx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 (56)
≤ E
y
∥∥∥(1B ⊗ πyC) (1B ⊗ V Hx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 (57)
=
1
2n
∥∥(
1B ⊗ V HC
) |ψ〉∥∥2 ≤ 1
2n
. (58)
A similar reasoning yields that β ≤ 4 · 2−n, where the 4 is a result of squaring the
upper bound ∥∥∥WHx,yC ∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥(UCOHx,yC )qC∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥V Hx,yC ∥∥∥ ≤ 2. (59)
Finally, noting that α+ β + 2
√
αβ ≤ 9 · 2−n finishes the proof.
4.4 Main Results
We now have all the necessary tools to prove our main results.
Theorem 22.
Let S be the QECM scheme defined in Definition 16. If the qPRF is modeled by a
quantum oracle, then S is log2(9)-uncloneable secure.
When we say that we model a qPRF as a quantum oracle, we mean that we
model the adversaries’ evaluations of the qPRF as queries to an oracle. Specifically,
if the key used in the encryption was (s, θ), we assume that the adversaries do not
receive s when the key is broadcasted, but rather that they receive quantum oracle
access to the function fλ(s, ·). Essentially, we are assuming that the adversaries
only use s to compute the function fλ(s, ·) and that they treat it as a black box.
Recall that we indicate that a circuit has oracle access to a function by placing this
function in superscript to the circuit and its CPTP map.
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Proof. Let A = (A, B, C) be a cloning attack against S as described in Definition 7.
We need to show that the probability that the adversaries can simultaneously guess
a message chosen uniformly at random is upper bounded by 9 · 2−n + η(λ) for a
negligible function η. Furthermore, since the adversaries treat the qPRF as an
oracle, it suffices to show that their winning probability is upper bounded by 9 ·
2−n+η(λ) when averaged over all functions in Bool(λ, n) and not only the functions
{fλ(s, ·)}s∈{0,1}λ . Indeed, by definition of a qPRF, their winning probability in both
cases can only differ by a negligible function of λ.
The remainder of the proof is an application of Lemma 21 followed by application
of Corollary 2.
Accounting for the randomness of the encryption and for a fixed and implicit λ,
the quantity we wish to bound is then given by
ω = E
H
E
θ
E
x
E
m
Tr
[
Pm
(
BHθ ⊗CHθ
) ◦ A(|m⊕H(x)〉〈m⊕H(x)| ⊗ ∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣)] (60)
where Pm = |m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m| and H ∈ Bool(λ, n). Then, by using Lemma 14 with
respect to the expectation over m to move the dependence on the string H(x) from
the state to the projector, we have that
ω = E
H
E
θ
E
x
E
m
Tr
[
Pm⊕H(x)
(
BHθ ⊗ CHθ
) ◦A(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣)] . (61)
Using standard purification arguments, we add auxiliary states |aux-B〉〈aux-B|
and |aux-C〉〈aux-C| to the state A(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣), replace the CPTP maps BHθ
and CHθ by unitary operators on the resulting larger Hilbert spaces and similarly
replace the projectors |m〉〈m| by projectors {πmB }m∈{0,1}n and {πmC }m∈{0,1}n on these
larger Hilbert spaces.
Following [BDF+11], these purified unitary operators will be of the form
(
U θLO
H
L
)qL ,
acting on a Hilbert space of the form Q(λ)LQ ⊗Q(n)LR⊗Q(sL)LS for some qL, sL ∈
N
+ as they model oracle computations. In particular, we note that qL represents
the number of queries made to the oracle by that particular party. We also assume
that
ρm,x,θ = A(|m〉〈m| ⊗
∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣)⊗ |aux-B〉〈aux-B| ⊗ |aux-C〉〈aux-C|
∈ D(Q(λ)BQ ⊗Q(n)BR ⊗Q(sB)BS ⊗Q(λ)CQ ⊗Q(n)CR ⊗Q(sC)CS ).
(62)
Finally, we can write ρm,x,θ as an ensemble of pure states, which is to say that
ρm,x,θ =
∑
i∈Im,x,θ
pi
∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉〈ψm,x,θi ∣∣∣ (63)
for some index set Im,x,θ, some non-zero pi which sum to 1, and some unit vectors∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉. It then follows that ω can be expressed as
E
m
E
θ
E
x
E
H
∑
i∈Im,x,θ
pi
∥∥∥(πm⊕H(x)B ⊗ πm⊕H(x)C )((U θBOHB )qB ⊗ (U θCOHC )qC) ∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉∥∥∥2.
(64)
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Noting that we can bring the expectation with respect to H into the summation,
we can then use Lemma 21 to upper bound ω by
9
2n
+ q E
m
E
θ
E
x
∑
i∈Im,x,θ
pi
√
E
H
E
k
E
ℓ
∥∥∥Qx ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) ∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉∥∥∥2 (65)
where q = (3qBqC + 2)qBqC and Qx = |x〉〈x|QB ⊗ |x〉〈x|QC . Defining
βθ,H,kx =
((
U θBO
H
B
)qB)† |x〉〈x|QB ((U θBOHB )qB) , (66)
and similarly for γθ,H,ℓx by replacing every instance of B with C, we use Jensen’s
lemma to bring the remaining expectations and sums into the square root and obtain
ω =
9
2n
+ q
√
E
m
E
θ
E
x
E
H
E
k
E
ℓ
Tr
[(
β
θ,H,k
x ⊗ γθ,H,k
)
ρm,x,θ
]
. (67)
Letting Φm to be the CPTP map defined by
ρ 7→ A (|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρ)⊗ |aux-B〉〈aux-B| ⊗ |aux-C〉〈aux-C| (68)
we see that, for any fixed H, k, ℓ, and m, Corollary 2 implies that
E
x
E
θ
Tr
[(
βθ,H,kx ⊗ γθ,H,k
)
ρm,x,θ
]
≤
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)λ
(69)
since ρm,x,θ = Φm
(∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣). Thus,
ω ≤ 9
2n
+ q
(√
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)λ
. (70)
Finally, since B and C are efficient quantum circuits, they may query the oracle
a number of time which grows at most polynomially in λ. Thus, q ≤ p(λ) for
some polynomial p. Noting that λ 7→ p(λ) ·
(√
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
is a negligible function
completes the proof.
We can strengthen this result if the adversaries do not share any entanglement.
Theorem 23.
Let S be the QECM scheme given in Definition 16. If the qPRF is modeled by
a quantum oracle and the adversaries cannot share any entanglement, then S is
0-uncloneable secure.
Proof (Sketch). Follow the proof of Theorem 22 using the bound given by Lemma 20,
instead of Lemma 21, in the step corresponding to Eq. (65).
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Corollary 24.
Let S be the QECM scheme given in Definition 16 with constant message size, i.e.:
n(λ) = n. If the qPRF is modeled by a quantum oracle and the adversaries cannot
share any entanglement, then S is indistinguishable-uncloneable secure.
Proof (Sketch). Use Theorem 23 with Theorem 12.
Acknowledgments
This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific
Research under award number FA9550-17-1-0083, Canada’s NSERC, an Ontario
ERA, and the University of Ottawa’s Research Chairs program.
References
[Aar09] S. Aaronson. Quantum copy-protection and quantum money. In 24th
Annual Conference on Computational Complexity—CCC 2009, pages
229–242, 2009.
DOI: 10.1109/CCC.2009.42.
[ABF+16] G. Alagic, A. Broadbent, B. Fefferman, T. Gagliardoni, C. Schaffner,
and M. St. Jules. Computational security of quantum encryption. In
Information Theoretic Security: 9th International Conference—ICITS
2016, pages 47–71, 2016.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-49175-2 3.
[AC12] S. Aaronson and P. Christiano. Quantum money from hidden sub-
spaces. In 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing—
STOC 2012, pages 41–60, 2012.
DOI: 10.1145/2213977.2213983.
[AKN98] D. Aharonov, A. Kitaev, and N. Nisan. Quantum circuits with mixed
states. In 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing—
STOC 1998, pages 20–30, 1998.
DOI: 10.1145/276698.276708.
[Bar16] E. Barker. Recommendation for key management part 1: General (re-
vision 4). Technical Report SP 800-57, National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 2016.
DOI: 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.
[BB84] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key dis-
tribution and coin tossing. In International Conference on Computers,
Systems and Signal Processing, pages 175–179, 1984.
28
[BBB14] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and S. Breidbart. Quantum cryptography
II: How to re-use a one-time pad safely even if P=NP. Natural Com-
puting, 13(4): 453–458, 2014.
DOI: 10.1007/s11047-014-9453-6.
[BBC+01] R. Beals, H. Buhrman, R. Cleve, M. Mosca, and R. de Wolf. Quantum
lower bounds by polynomials. Journal of the ACM, 48(4): 778–797,
2001.
DOI: 10.1145/502090.502097.
[BDF+11] D. Boneh, O¨. Dagdelen, M. Fischlin, A. Lehmann, C. Schaffner, and
M. Zhandry. Random oracles in a quantum world. In Advances in
Cryptology—ASIACRYPT 2011, pages 41–69, 2011.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0 3.
[BS16] A. Broadbent and C. Schaffner. Quantum cryptography beyond quan-
tum key distribution. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 78(1): 351–382,
2016.
DOI: 10.1007/s10623-015-0157-4.
[Die82] D. Dieks. Communication by EPR devices. Physics Letters A, 92(6):
271–272, 1982.
DOI: 10.1016/0375-9601(82)90084-6.
[DPS05] I. Damg˚ard, T. B. Pedersen, and L. Salvail. A quantum cipher with
near optimal key-recycling. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2005,
pages 494–510, 2005.
DOI: 10.1007/11535218 30.
[EPR35] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen. Can quantum-mechanical de-
scription of physical reality be considered complete? Physical Review
Letters, 47(10): 777–780, 1935.
DOI: 10.1103/physrev.47.777.
[FS17] S. Fehr and L. Salvail. Quantum authentication and encryption with
key recycling. In Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2017, pages
311–338, 2017.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56617-7 11.
[GM84] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Com-
puter and System Sciences, 28(2): 270–299, 1984.
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0000(84)90070-9.
[Got03] D. Gottesman. Uncloneable encryption. Quantum Information & Com-
putation, 3(6): 581–602, 2003.
29
[Lor19] S. Lord. Uncloneable quantum encryption via random oracles. Master’s
thesis, University of Ottawa, 2019.
DOI: 10.20381/ruor-23107.
[NC00] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum
Information. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[Par70] J. L. Park. The concept of transition in quantum mechanics. Founda-
tions of Physics, 1(1): 23–33, 1970.
DOI: 10.1007/BF00708652.
[SP00] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill. Simple proof of security of the BB84 quan-
tum key distribution protocol. Physical Review Letters, 85(2): 441–444,
2000.
DOI: 10.1103/physrevlett.85.441.
[TFKW13] M. Tomamichel, S. Fehr, J. Kaniewski, and S. Wehner. A monogamy-
of-entanglement game with applications to device-independent quantum
cryptography. New Journal of Physics, 15(10): 103002, 2013.
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/15/10/103002.
[Unr15] D. Unruh. Revocable quantum timed-release encryption. Journal of the
ACM, 62(6): 49, 2015.
DOI: 10.1145/2817206.
[Wat09] J. Watrous. Quantum computational complexity. In Encyclopedia of
complexity and systems science, pages 7174–7201. Springer, 2009.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5 428-3.
[Wat18] J. Watrous. The Theory of Quantum Information. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1st edition, 2018.
[Wie83] S. Wiesner. Conjugate coding. ACM SIGACT News, 15(1): 78–88,
1983.
DOI: 10.1145/1008908.1008920.
[WZ82] W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek. A single quantum cannot be cloned.
Nature, 299: 802–803, 1982.
DOI: 10.1038/299802a0.
[Zha12] M. Zhandry. How to construct quantum random functions. In 53rd
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science—FOCS 2012,
pages 679–687, 2012.
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2012.37.
30
A′
A
G
Enck(|m〉〈m|)
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Figure 4: A cloning-distinguishing attack A = (G, A, B, C) is used to construct a
cloning attack A′ = (A′, B′, C′). The D circuit outputs |0n〉〈0n| if b = 0 and |m′〉〈m′|
if b = 1.
A Technical Proofs
Proof (Theorem 12). Let S be a 0-uncloneable secure QECM scheme with constant
message size, i.e.: n(λ) = n. Let A = (G, A, B, C) be a cloning-distinguishing attack
against S. We will construct a cloning attack A′ = (A′, B′, C′) and show that the
winning probability of A is at most 2n−1 times the winning probability of A′. Since
S is uncloneable secure, A′’s winning probability is bounded by 2−n + η(λ), which
is sufficient to prove this theorem.
We now describe the circuits in the A′ attack. A schematic representation of
this construction is given in Fig. 4.
A′: Run G from A and obtain the state G(1) ∈ D(HS ⊗ HM ). Measure the M
register in the computational basis and call the result m′. Discard the register
M and keep the register S. Then, run A from A on the state received as input
and the state that was kept in the register S. In addition, give a copy of m′
to both B′ and C′.
B′: Run B from A on the state obtained from A′ and the encryption key. Measure
the output in the computational basis and if the result is 0, output |0n〉〈0n|.
If the result is 1, output the |m′〉〈m′| from the string which was given by A′.
C′: Analogous to B′.
We want to obtain a description of the overall state up to the point immediately
after the B and C circuits are applied by B′ and C′. Conditioned on the message m
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being encrypted with the key k, we will denote this state by ρm,k
A′BC
. From this state,
we will be able to determine the winning probability of A′.
Note that A′’s first step is to obtain G(1) and measure theM register in the com-
putational basis. We define pm′ = Tr [(IS ⊗ |m′〉〈m′|M )G(1)] to be the probability
that m′ is measured and
σm
′
= TrM
[
(IS ⊗ |m′〉〈m′|M )G(1)(IS ⊗ |m′〉〈m′|M )
pm′
]
(71)
to be the post measurement state conditioned on this result and after tracing out
the M register. Defining
σm,k,m
′
= σm′ ⊗ Enck(|m〉〈m|) (72)
allows us to write the output state of A′, conditioned onm being originally encrypted
with the key k, as
ρ
m,k
A’
=
∑
m′∈{0,1}n
pm′A(σ
m,k,m′)⊗ ∣∣m′〉〈m′∣∣⊗ ∣∣m′〉〈m′∣∣ . (73)
Thus, we have that
ρ
m,k
A’BC
=
∑
m′∈{0,1}n
pm′(Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A(σm,k,m′)⊗
∣∣m′〉〈m′∣∣⊗ ∣∣m′〉〈m′∣∣ . (74)
To compute A′’s winning probability on message m and key k, we define
qm,k = Tr
[
(|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|)ρm,k
A’BC
]
(75)
= pmTr
[
(|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|)(B ⊗ C) ◦ A(σm,k,m)
]
(76)
and note that if m 6= 0n, then A′’s winning probability is given by qm. If m = 0n,
we must also account for the possibility that the measurements after the B and C
circuits both output 0. Thus, A′’s winning probability in this case is at least
q0n,k +Tr

(|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|)

(Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦ A

 ∑
m′∈{0,1}n
pm′σ
0n,k,m′





 (77)
as we ignore any winning scenarios where the measurement results are different.
We then have that A′’s winning probability is at least
E
k←K
1
2n

 ∑
m∈{0,1}n
qm,k +Tr
[
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|)
(
(Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦ A
(
σ0
n,k
))] (78)
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where σ0
n,k =
∑
m′∈{0,1}n pm′σ
0n,k,m′ . Since S is uncloneable secure, there exists
a negligible function η such that Eq. (78) is upper bounded by 2−n + η(λ). This
implies that
E
k←K
1
2

 ∑
m∈{0,1}n
qm,k +Tr
[
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|)
(
(Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦ A
(
σ0
n,k
))] (79)
is upper bounded by 12 + 2
n−1η(λ). Noting that Eq. (79) is precisely A’s winning
probability and that λ 7→ 2n−1η(λ) is negligible completes the proof.
Proof (Corollary 2). It suffices to apply Theorem 1 with the state
ρ = (1A ⊗ ΦA′) |EPRλ〉〈EPRλ|AA′ =
1
2λ
∑
r,s∈{0,1}λ
|r〉〈s| ⊗ Φ (|r〉〈s|) , (80)
which is the result of applying the map Φ to the second half of λ EPR pairs. Note
that for all θ ∈ {0, 1}λ we have that
1
2λ
∑
r,s∈{0,1}λ
|r〉〈s| ⊗ Φ (|r〉〈s|) = 1
2λ
∑
r,s∈{0,1}λ
∣∣∣rθ〉〈sθ∣∣∣⊗ Φ(∣∣∣rθ〉〈sθ∣∣∣) . (81)
We then have that
E
θ
∑
x∈{0,1}λ
Tr
[(∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣⊗Bθx ⊗ Cθx) ρ]
= E
θ
1
2λ
∑
x,r,s∈{0,1}λ
Tr
[(∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣⊗Bθx ⊗ Cθx)(∣∣∣rθ〉〈sθ∣∣∣⊗ Φ(∣∣∣rθ〉〈sθ∣∣∣))]
= E
θ
1
2λ
∑
x∈{0,1}λ
Tr
[(
Bθx ⊗Cθx
)
Φ
(∣∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣∣)] .
(82)
Thus the bound given in Theorem 1 is directly applicable.
Proof (Lemma 14). Recall that for any fixed string s ∈ {0, 1}n, the map x 7→ x⊕ s
is a permutation which is its own inverse. If we define the map g : {0, 1}n → R by
x 7→ f(x, x⊕ s), we then have that
E
x
f(x, x⊕ s) = E
x
g(x) = E
x
g(x⊕ s) = E
x
f(x⊕ s, x) (83)
which concludes the proof.
Proof (Lemma 17). Proceed by induction over n noting that(
an +
n−1∑
k=0
an−k−1bck
)
c = an+1 +
(n+1)−1∑
k=0
a(n+1)−k−1bck. (84)
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Proof (Lemma 18). We first note that ‖v0‖ ≤ ‖
∑n
i=0 vi‖+
∑n
i=1 ‖vi‖ ≤ 1+n. Then,
using the triangle inequality, we have that∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=0
vi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
(
n∑
i=0
‖vi‖
)2
=
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
‖vi‖ · ‖vj‖. (85)
We consider the summands in the right hand side differently depending on the value
of i. If i = 0, we note that
n∑
j=0
‖v0‖ · ‖vj‖ ≤ ‖v0‖2 + (n+ 1)
n∑
j=1
‖vj‖. (86)
If i 6= 1, we note that
n∑
j=0
‖vi‖ · ‖vj‖ ≤ ‖vi‖
n∑
j=0
‖vj‖ ≤ ((n+ 1) + n) ‖vi‖. (87)
We obtain the result by adding each of these bounds.
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